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Homeric Greek
In Homeric Greek, BARE REFLEXIVES bear case, person, and number features. The third person singular bare reflexive is made from the pronominal stem ἕ-: Sg.Gen. ἕο, οὗ, Sg.Acc. ἕε, ἕ, Sg.Dat. οἷ. The plural forms in σφ-, and the first and second person forms, are shared with the personal pronouns, e.g. (2f). The reflexives require a subject antecedent (overt or null) within the same finite domain, either in the same clause, as in (2a,b,c), or across an infinitive clause boundary, either ECM as in (2d,f,g), or object control as in (2h). The same antecedent requirement holds for the reflexive possessive ἑός, ἑή, ἑόν, which agrees with the head in gender, case, and number, like an adjective (see (2c)). Il. 24.134 [Zeus] says that of all the immortals he is especially enraged question might be a heterogeneous mix of discourse anaphors and logophors; in any case they will not play a role in the present discussion. [nothing is worse than a belly] which forces one to remember it If the reflexive is a COARGUMENT of the antecedent, it must be reinforced by αὐτό-'self', inflected for gender, case, and number. The two words form a phrasal COMPLEX REFLEXIVE, which can be syntactically separated by clitics. αὐτό-must also be added to the 1/2 person pronouns in their reflexive use, as in (3d). Il. 10.307 and to whoever would win glory for himself
The clitics ἑο, ἑ, οἱ -identical to the bare reflexives ἕο, ἕ, οἷ except for being unaccented -refer to a discourse topic. Being referentially dependent, they cannot be used deictically, nor can they head restrictive relative clauses. But unlike reflexives, they do not require a structural antecedent. Il. 10.304 [Context: Who is there who would promise me this deed and and accomplish it for a great gift?] His reward will be certain.
Unlike anaphors, PRONOMINALS are referentially independent. They can introduce a new discourse topic (though they need not do so), require no antecedent, and can be used deictically and as heads of restrictive relative clauses.
Each of the three types of Homeric anaphor has numerous parallels in familiar languages. Bare reflexives are SE-anaphors in the sense of Reinhart & Reuland 1993, comparable to Dutch zich and Swedish sig. The complex reflexives are what R&R call SELF-anaphors; Homeric ἑὲ αὐτόν (later Greek ἑαυτόν) are analogous to Dutch zichzelf and Swedish sig själv; in fact, the second component αὐτό-also functions outside of the pronominal system as an "emphatic" predicate of identity, e.g. αὐτὸν βασιλῆα 'the king himself' (Il. 7.179), just as själv does. As for discourse anaphors, though not as highly profiled in Germanic, they are represented by English it (as opposed to he, she, which are pronominals). Another well-known example is German er, sie, which behave like discourse anaphors when refering to inanimates and like pronominals when refering to animates. The ones that also function reflexively, such as Old English hine, are more famous because they pose a puzzle for binding theories; we will investigate a selection of them below and show that they have analogs in Greek.
Classical Greek
Two post-Homeric innovations transform the Homeric system into the system of Classical Greek prose. The bare 3.Sg. reflexives ἕο, ἕ, οἷ, as well as the 1Sg. and 2Sg. pronouns ἐμέ, σέ in their reflexive function (e.g. (3d)), fused with αὐτοῦ, αὐτόν, αὐτῷ into a set of new compound reflexives ἑαυτό-, ἐμαυτό-, σεαυτό-. In a second development fully completed only after Herodotus, bare αὐτοῦ, αὐτόν, αὐτῷ replaced unaccented ἑο, ἑ, οἱ as discourse anaphors, while still keeping the emphatic use they already had in Homeric, e.g. αὐτοῦ Κύρου 'of Cyrus himself' (Xen. Anab. 1.2.21).
The loss of the simple reflexives ἕο, ἕ, οἷ caused the distinction between bare and complex reflexives seen in (2) and (3) to be neutralized in the third person. The new compound reflexives that replace them in Classical Greek have the combined distribution of both; they simply require a subject antecedent within the same finite domain, either in the same clause or across an infinitive clause boundary, and they don't care whether it is a coargument or not. On the other hand, coargumenthood still matters for the reflexives of the first and second persons. In these persons, compound reflexives must have an antecedent within their clause. If the antecedent is a coargument, the compound reflexives are obligatory, otherwise the plain first and second person pronouns are also possible.
The outcome of these changes is that anaphors now differentiate between four successively larger domains, (A) coarguments, (B) clause-internal, (C) finite, (D) discourse. These are presented in (5)-(8).
(A) If the antecedent is a coargument (and therefore necessarily within the same clause), the reflexive is obligatory for all persons: in (5a), ἑαυτάς 'themselves' could not be replaced by σφᾶς 'them', and in (5b), ἐμαυτήν 'myself' could not be replaced by ἐμέ 'me'. Gorgias, Palamedes I want to say something odious but true about me (C) The third person reflexive ἑαυτό-can have an antecedent across a clause boundary, but it must be within a finite clause. Non-reflexive αὐτοῦ, αὐτόν, αὐτῷ, the plural σφέων, σφίσι, σφέας (σφᾶς), and in Herodotus, the 3Sg. clitic μιν, also occur in this configuration, as in (7d,e,f); in (7g) the reflexive anaphor ἑωυτῷ alternates with the discourse anaphor αὐτὸν in parallel infinitive clauses governed by the same verb. Again, first and second person reflexives are more restricted: they cannot have a long-distance antecedent at all. For example, reflexive ἐμαυτοῦ could not replace ἐμοῦ in (7f) (in the intended sense where περὶ ἐμοῦ is in the lower clause). He ordered them to build him houses worthy of his royal power, and to strengthen him with spearmen.
(D) In discourse anaphora, αὐτό-is used in the oblique cases, as the functional counterparts of nominative ∅, οἱ. For example, in (8a), the demonstrative ἐκείνων 'their' brings in a discourse topic, which is then anaphorically referred to by αὐτούς. In the more complex (8b) -the continuation of example (7e) -there are two concurrent foregrounded topics, Cyrus and the exiles, each referred to by αὐτό-. [Context: Cyrus i urged the exiles j ∅ j to go to war together with him i ,] ∅ i promising them j that, if he i should successfully accomplish the mission for which he i was going to war, he i would not stop until he i had brought them j home. And they j gladly obeyed, for they j trusted him j .
Perhaps surprisingly, neither of the Greek stages are easy to reconcile with current theories of binding and anaphora. I will attempt an analysis in two of them, the very sophisticated one of Reinhart & Reuland (1993) and Reuland (2001) , and a rather more naive proposal of my own (Kiparsky 2002) . Their affinities make for some instructive comparisons, which in my opinion come out in favor of the latter.
Binding, blocking, and obviation
My proposal (Kiparsky 2002 , I'll call it Blocking and Obviation Theory, or BOT for short) is based on the idea that the structural properties of pronouns, and of anaphors in particular, are exhaustively characterized by two parameters, whose settings specify (a) their anaphoric domain, and (b) whether they are OBVIATIVE or NON-OBVIATIVE. (9) a. They form a stringency hierarchy:
(11) The anaphoric domain hierarchy clause-bound reflexives long-distance reflexives discourse anaphors pronominals By separating reflexivity from the more general property of referential dependency, we predict a class of referentially dependent non-reflexive anaphors, with a well-defined profile that is quite distinct from the familiar local and long-distance reflexives, as well as from referentially independent pronominals. This class of anaphors has long been recognized by descriptive grammarians and typologists under the designation DISCOURSE ANAPHORS. The clitic anaphors ἑο, ἑ, οἱ instantiate it in Greek. BOT offers a way to accommodate this kind of anaphor in binding theory.
BLOCKING dictates the use of the most restricted element available in a given context. The principle of Blocking is not specific to binding theory, but a general principle of grammar (essentially the same as the Elsewhere Condition). For example, anaphors are used in preference to pronominals in contexts where the constraints on both are otherwise satisfied, and anaphors which require clausal antecedents are used in preference to anaphors which permit long-distance antecedents in contexts where the constraints on both are otherwise satisfied. Burzio (1996 Burzio ( , 1998 was the first to build Blocking explicitly into binding theory in order to account for the (quasi-)complementarity between anaphors and pronominals. Other, conceptually different approaches to anaphor/pronominal complementarity are the "obligatory reflexivization" transformation of Lees and Klima 1963 , and R&R's principle that when a chain that licenses a reflexive can be formed, it must be, because it is more economical.
Within GB-style binding theories, extending and parametrizing the syntactic binding domain is not very attractive because it creates an arbitrary asymmetry between Principle A and Principle B. Why should anaphors have expanded binding domains, when pronominals do not (Cole, Hermon & Huang 2006: 49-50) ? BOT is not subject to this objection, for in this approach only anaphors have a syntactic binding domain, and there is no Principle B. The work that Principle B does in other theories is apportioned between Blocking and the OBVIATION constraint, neither of which can, for principled reasons, have a parametrizable domain.
Obviation requires coarguments to have disjoint reference (Hellan 1988 , Dalrymple 1993 ).
(12) Obviation A pronoun marked as obviative cannot overlap in reference with a coargument.
Obviation is defined over the invariant semantic domain where argument structure is represented, and it does not restrict the syntactic distribution of pronouns but their semantic interpretation. Thus, it enforces disjoint reference in (13a) and (13b), and the collective reading of the plural in (13c) and the conjunct in (13d). (13) In Homeric Greek as well, it is the collective reading of the conjunction that licenses the bare reflexive in a case like (14a). As the context indicates, the shame is supposed to fall collectively on the women. Our analysis predicts that this is the only interpretation of the sentence. Swedish allows sig in analogous cases, contrast (14b) with (14c). R&R's (1993) Condition B also applies to semantic predicates, in a technically and conceptually different way.
Lexical items, though, can be parametrically specified for whether they trigger Obviation. I'll assume that [+Obviative] is the default and that pronouns (both pronominals and anaphors) as well as verbal predicates may be lexically marked as [-Obviative] , meaning that their coarguments may overlap in reference. The cross-classification of obviation and the antecedent domain specification for pronouns makes two important predictions. First, it predicts the existence of a class of obviative reflexives, i.e. reflexives that are subject to a disjoint reference requirement (e.g. Swedish sig, Dutch zich, and Homeric accented ἕ-), beside the unsurprising non-obviative reflexives (such as German sich and Classical Greek ἑαυτόν). Secondly, it predicts non-obviative pronominals (e.g. Old English him, Malay dirinya, Turkish kendisi), beside the unsurprising obviative ones (English him, Classical Greek μιν).
For 
idhios him Obviative
Are there deeper principles that derive the parameter settings from some independent properties of pronouns, rather than lexically stipulating them? For phrasal anaphors and transparently compounded anaphors, there are. Elements such as self, αὐτό-are [-Obviative] markers that pass their feature to the complex reflexives they form. These are actually compositional. Complex reflexives of the form POSS+N (where N = 'head', 'body' etc.) get around obviation by a kind of syntactic Trojan horse that smuggles in the semantic coargument as a structural possessor. But for simple anaphors, there exist only tendencies that connect the form and function of anaphors (Faltz 1977) but no absolute principles (Huang 2000) , and the tendencies can be understood as consequences of well-understood historical processes (Kiparsky 2008) . As far as I have been able to determine, obviation is an unpredictable lexical property of simple pronouns; attempts to reduce it to F-feature composition, to morphological or phonological properties, or to any parameter of the language at large, are unlikely to succeed, as I will argue further in section 4. It is true that long-distance reflexives are typically monomorphemic and have a reduced set of morphosyntactic feature specifications, but as we have just seen, Classical Greek ἑαυτό-is a clear example of a long-distance reflexive that is bimorphemic and inflects for all morphosyntactic features of the nominal system. The rise of Homeric phrasal ἑὲ αὐτόν and its transition to the classical singleword ἑαυτόν neatly demonstrates both the diachronic origin of the correlation, and its breakdown: the characteristic trajectory is that complex reflexives arise as strategies for defeating the obviation of the pronouns they come from, but when their compositionality is lost they may begin to act like simple intrinsically non-obviative reflexives.
One might object on conceptual grounds to a theory in which the near-complementarity of pronominals and anaphors is derived from the interaction of two distinct theoretical principles, Blocking and Obviation. In fact, this is a this is a virtue of the analysis because it explains where the complementarity fails. As an illustration of the independence and interaction of blocking and obviation in English, consider (18) and (19) . In (18), Blocking is required to exclude the ungrammatical sentences, for obviation is inapplicable because there is no coargument relation. For example, in (18a), I and me are not coarguments, so the reason *me is excluded must be because it is pre-empted by myself.
(18) a. I believe *me myself to have been cheated.
b. Richard i seems innocent to *him i himself .
c. You praise everyone except *you yourself .
As for Obviation, we have already seen that it is independently necessary for the semantics of sentences like (13). This leads to the interesting prediction that neither the reflexive nor the pronominal is available in cases like (19). Here *them cannot be excluded by Blocking because the reflexive themselves is not licensed (since split antecedents are excluded for independent reasons), but Obviation correctly rules it out.
(19) John i discussed Bill j with *themselves i+j . *them i+j .
If the antecedent of a reflexive is a coargument, the reflexive must be [-Obviative] (proximate), and interpreted as a bound anaphor. Only "sloppy identity" is available in (20).
(20) John hates himself, and so does Fred.
= "Fred also hates himself" (sloppy)
My impression is that this generalization holds for Greek as well, though I have not made a systematic study of the Greek data in this respect. The following example means, and presumably could only mean, that the men also threw themselves down, not that men also threw the women down ("sloppy" rather than "strict" identity).
(21) αἱ If the antecedent is not a coargument, however, the strict reading is available, in English. Since coargument disjoint reference is universal, BOT predicts the same for Greek. predict the same for (22) a. John considers himself competent, and so does Fred.
(ambiguous)
b. John has a picture of himself, and so does Fred.
c. Mary quoted every author except herself, and so did Bill.
To repeat: obviation applies in a semantic domain (coarguments) and constrains semantic interpretation, whereas Blocking applies in a syntactic domain and constrains syntactic representation. And the two principles apply to different classes of elements, interacting with each other and with other constraints. Descriptively speaking, the strength of blocking decreases with the size of the domain. In longdistance domains, variation between reflexive and non-reflexive is observed in Swedish, Icelandic, Latin, Czech, Russian, and Chinese, as documented in Kiparsky 2002 . The right way to think of this variation is probably that it is caused by the interference of other factors. In her study of Herodotus' use of ἑωυτόν, Peels (2007, Ch. 3) makes a good case that non-reflexives in cases where long-distance reflexives are allowed (e.g. (7d,e)) are due to such factors as speaker perspective, intervention of other subjects (as in Chinese, see Cole et al. 2006) , and the avoidance of ambiguity.
We are now ready to spell out the Greek systems of anaphora. Reinhart and Reuland (1993) (29) Definitions a. The SYNTACTIC PREDICATE formed of (a head) P is P, all its syntactic arguments, and an external argument of P (subject).
b. The SYNTACTIC ARGUMENTS of P are the projections assigned T-role or Case by P.
c. The SEMANTIC PREDICATE formed of P is P and all its arguments at the relevant semantic level.
d. A predicate is REFLEXIVE iff two of its arguments are coindexed.
e. A predicate (formed of P) is REFLEXIVE-MARKED iff either P is lexically reflexive or one of P's arguments is a SELF anaphor (defined as "an anaphor that is able to reflexivize a predicate").
SE-anaphors are pronouns, while SELF anaphors are DPs. The SELF contained in complex reflexives is an identity predicate of category N, which combines with a determiner (pronominal or SE) into a referentially dependent DP. SELF "reflexive-marks" the predicate of which it is a syntactic argument, by covertly adjoining to its head and restricting its interpretation. Long-distance anaphora is licensed by syntactic chains -A-chains -that connect an anaphor to its antecedent. Configurational effects on anaphor binding derive from constraints on A-chain formation. A-chain can cross non-finite clause boundaries, but not finite clause boundaries. Anaphors may appear outside A-chains, but in that case they are subject only to discourse factors, in particular to those governing their logophoric uses.
(30) a. A maximal A-chain (α 1 ,. . . , α n ) contains exactly one link -α 1 -that is both +R and Case-marked, and exactly one T-marked link. (RR 698) b. An NP is +R (Referentially independent) iff it is fully specified for F-features.
(30b) implies that whether a pronoun is an anaphor or a pronominal is predictable from its morphosyntactic feature composition. If it is specified for a restricted set of morphosyntactic features (F-features), it is anaphoric, because it cannot project an independently interpretable argument. Specifically, a SE-anaphor is a featurally deficient determiner, which like ordinary pronouns occupies the head position of a DP. It is deficient if it lacks at least number and gender, and it may also lack person and/or case. Although it cannot project an independently interpretable argument, it is still a syntactic argument, since it is a pronoun, and therefore falls under Condition B.
RT on Greek
Let us consider what RT would say about the individual Greek anaphors discussed in the previous section. The compound reflexives ἑαυτό-, ἐμαυτό-, σεαυτό-of post-Homeric Greek are anaphors, but what kind? On the one hand, RT tells us that the complex reflexives are SELFanaphors, for they are morphologically complex, they bear the F-features of person, gender, number, and case, and they are not subject to condition B, and do not need strengthening by a SELFelement. On the other hand, the theory also says that the complex reflexives are SE-anaphors, for they are subject-oriented, occur in adjuncts and other non-coargument positions, and function as long-distance anaphors. But the theory is so constructed that no pronoun can be both a SELFanaphor and a SE-anaphor, for the two categories have incompatible properties. The categorial distinction between them cannot be neutralized in a single lexeme. A given reflexive either has the required F-features or it doesn't have them, and it is either a determiner or a full DP. So RT ends up having to claim that the compound reflexives ἑαυτό-, ἐμαυτό-, σεαυτό-of post-Homeric Greek are two sets of homonymous pronouns.
Next, what about the Homeric Greek bare reflexives ἕο, ἕ, οἷ? They are specified for number, person, and structural case, but not for gender. Thus, they does not meet the criteria for defectivity either, because they bear at least one F-feature that SE-anaphors are not supposed to have. In fact, the bare reflexives are specified for the same features as the first and second person pronouns, which certainly can project independent arguments. And the bare reflexives are morphologically identical with the third person non-reflexive pronouns, which also project independent arguments. So it is hard to see how the third person bare reflexives could be morphologically too impoverished to project independent arguments. R&R (1995) further suggest that phonological defectiveness -in particular the lack of stress or of stressability -also causes a pronoun to be anaphoric. They hypothesize that even simple reflexives are somehow like SELF reflexives if they are stressable, noting that German sich is stressable and that it can refer to a coargument without being strengthened by a SELF element, in contrast to Dutch zich and Scandinavian sig, which are neither stressable not can refer by themselves to a coargument. But for Greek, the accentual criterion goes in the wrong direction. It is the accented bare reflexive ἕ-functions as a SE-reflexive, while its unaccented clitic counterpart function as a discourse anaphor (which would have to be treated as a pronominal in RT). So, within Greek, neither F-feature composition, nor stress, or stressability, can be the criterial difference between SELF-reflexives, SE-reflexives, and pronominals.
What does RT have to say about the unaccented clitic ἑο, ἑ, οἱ? It is certainly referentially dependent, in that it cannot be used deictically, nor head restrictive relative clauses, or introduce new discourse topics in any other way. But unlike reflexives, it does not need an antecedent, not even a long-distance one. In principle, it could refer to something not mentioned that is unambiguously clear from the context. Pronouns of this type, DISCOURSE ANAPHORS, are extremely common; in fact, English it has the same properties, unlike the gendered pronouns him and her. Note that they are not necessarily "unstressable": it can get contrastive stress under focus, and apparently so can the discourse anaphors in Homer; the accent on οἷ in (31) must be contrastive, for it is not a reflexive since it does not have a subject antecedent: To answer this question we will need to take a closer look at the discourse anaphors. In the next section we do this by turning to the 3Sg. object clitic μιν.
Referentially dependent non-reflexive pronouns

Greek μιν
In early Greek, Plural σφέων, σφίσι, σφέας (σφᾶς), and the 3Sg. object pronoun μιν function as discourse anaphors, and also as reflexives, duly reinforced with αὐτό-when locally bound to a coargument. We will focus on μιν, which is a gender-neutral accusative singular clitic. Pl.Acc. σφεας can be considered its plural counterpart and works in a similar way; the following argumentation could be essentially replicated for this pronoun. μιν is rare in Homeric, but (32a) illustrates its local reflexive use with αὐτό-, and (32b) illustrates how μιν serves by itself as a discourse anaphor. Note in (32a) that μιν follows αὐτό-, which is the reverse order from that of the other complex reflexives. The reason is that μιν is always clitic and must lean on something to its left.
μιν is common in the Ionic dialect of Herodotus, which represents in some ways an intermediate stage between Homeric and the classical language. Its range of uses are illustrated in (33) [Gyges sneaked out of the room.] The woman caught sight of him as he went out.
After Herodotus, the non-reflexive uses of the plural σφέων, σφίσι, σφᾶς are lost, and μιν disappears entirely. In terms of our parametric approach, μιν must be a non-reflexive referentially dependent pronoun -a discourse anaphor. The relevant parameter specification for anaphors only fixes the upper bound of the domain in which the reference of the must be identified. The setting for μιν merely says that it must get its reference within the discourse. Nothing precludes it from having a local or long-distance antecedent within a subpart of the discourse. The theory does not allow imposing a lower syntactic bound on the distance between antecedent and anaphor. A lower bound emerges through competition with other anaphors. In general, when discourse anaphors serve as reflexives, it is only when they are not blocked by another anaphor. For example, a discourse anaphor will be blocked in those domains where a more restricted anaphors that require an antecedent within the clausal or finite domain is available; thus it does not occur in environments where itself is permitted. There are essentially two ways in which a discourse anaphor can function as a reflexive.
The more obvious way for there to be no blocking is when there is no competing more restricted anaphor in the language. So, in languages without reflexives, non-obviative discourse anaphors can fill in for them, and function effectively as reflexives. This is what happens in languages whose pronouns are built on the opposition between proximate and obviative pronouns (rather than on the opposition between pronominals and anaphors). These famously include Algonquian (for a BOT analysis, based on Grafstein 1988 , 1999 , see Kiparsky 2002 . What Cole et al. (2006) call "pronominal long-distance reflexives" (such as Malay dirinya and Turkish kendisi), which lack logophoric conditions, as they point out, are from this perspective really [-Obviative] discourse anaphors. Less exotically, this is what happens in those Germanic languages that lost their inherited reflexive sig-pronoun, notably Old English, Frisian, and early Dutch. The second way in which blocking can fail is when the discourse anaphor successfully competes with a more restrictive reflexive on the basis of another advantage that it has over it. Specifically, a discourse anaphor which is morphologically underspecified or which is a clitic can be preferred over a more restricted reflexive anaphor for reasons of economy. This is an instance of the pervasive tension between feature subsumption (preference for the more highly specified form) and economy (preference for the simpler form), which underlies much grammatical variation.
3 In Kiparsky 2005 I model its dynamics in OT and provide examples of it from several languages. Feature subsumption and economy are there formalized in the obvious way as FAITHFULNESS and MARKEDNESS constraints, respectively.
The variation between the clitic μιν and the orthotonic reflexives in local domains is a classic instance of such variation between a simpler underspecified form and a more complex fully specified form.
How would RT deal with μιν? Previous RT analyses of similar situations where discourse anaphors are also used reflexively have explored a variety of solutions. We cannot appeal to Ffeature deficiency, since μιν bears number, person, and case. Could we exploit its isolated nature in the pronominal paradigm -the lack of a matching dative, for example -and posit that feature values which are not contrastive in some sense don't count? That seems out of the question because μιν must count as positively specified for accusative case, third person, and singular number, simply in order to be restricted to the right referents and the right syntactic contexts. For example, it does not occur as a dative object, it cannot have a plural antecedent, and it cannot have a first and second person antecedent.
Another way out would be to suppose that accusative case on objects in Greek is not a structural case, as Reuland and Reinhart 1995 propose for Frisian, and Reuland and Everaert 2010 for Old English (dubiously, as we shall see in a moment). It seems clear that this is not a viable analysis, since the Greek accusative has all the hallmarks of a structural case, including replacement by nominative case under passivization.
Nor can the lack of accent or the clitic status of μιν be made responsible for its referential dependency, for Greek has a very full set of inherently unaccented clitic pronouns that must count as pronominals in RT.
In section 5 I show that its discourse anaphoric uses cannot be explained away as logophoric either, because they have none of the defining characteristics of logophors.
Apart from the empirical and technical difficulties that these analyses face, they are unsatisfactory for two general reasons. First, they end up splitting μιν into two or even three different homonyms, without any independent evidence in the language. Secondly, they fail to provide a unified analysis for the remarkably uniform and orderly behavior of discourse anaphors across languages.
Parallels
To appreciate the typological parallels, and the full extent of the damage that RT does to the analysis of them, let us briefly review the discourse anaphors that are analogous to μιν in the other languages mentioned. For the Old English case in (36), RT suppose that it has "the parametrically fixed property of no structural case for the object", so that its pronouns do not have the full set of F-features, and are hence referentially dependent. But the assumption that Old English lacks structural case is quite implausible, since it has the same four-case system as German, whose accusative and nominative cases are certainly structural (as Reuland and Reinhart 1995: 251 themselves note), and for that matter the same case system as Greek. Like German, Old English has a lexically marked class of verbs whose objects bear inherent case, which is retained under NPmovement processes, but apart from these, verbs assign structural accusative case to their nominal and pronominal objects, which is replaced by nominative case in passives (Fischer 1992 , Denison 1993 : 104, Fischer et al. 2000 . This is a standard diagnostic for structural case. In support of their claim that Old English had no structural case, Reuland and Everaert cite van Gelderen (2000) , who however offers no evidence for it. Her suggestion that all passives in Old English might be adjectival, and that their agent phrases might really be instrumental is refuted by every page of Old English prose. True verbal passives with promoted nominative subjects and specified human agents are frequent in the texts from the entire OE period, their eventive character diagnosed by adjuncts that are incompatible with non-eventive readings, such as manner adverbs (37a), temporal adverbs that locate the event at a point or interval of time or specify its duration (37b), locatives (37c), true agentive phrases (37d), and simply by contextual plausibility (37e). (37) Compared to German and Old English, Frisian has a reduced Case system, in fact so reduced that the problem becomes not so much motivating the absence of structural Case as the presence of inherent Case. R&R's argument rests on a contrast between two object pronouns in the third person feminine singular (har vs. se) and third person plural (har, harren vs. se). Se differs from har (and from other pronouns, such as him) in that it cannot be locally bound: Following Hoekstra 1991, R&R base an account of these data on the observation that se (unlike har, him, etc.) cannot occur in free datives or in locative PPs, a distributional restriction which they attribute to a requirement for se to receive structural Case under government by a lexical projection. They further posit that har and him can only get inherent Case, that Frisian has a subsystem of inherent Case with only one member, and that a pronoun object bearing an inherent case of this kind is F-defective, and bears the feature [-R], i.e. is referentially dependent as a result of which reflexive uses of har are possible.
But har and the other personal pronouns also have a pronominal use, with disjoint reference with respect to the subject (as in (40a)), in which case they cannot be F-defective, hence cannot bear inherent Case. Thus R&R analysis entails that Frisian object pronouns (other than se) are systematically ambiguous, bearing either the language's sole putative inherent Case, or a morphologically identical accusative case which is structural, hence not retained under passivization: 'he was called X' is hy wurdt X neamd (and not *him wurdt X neamd). This seems a high price to pay for saving RT in the face of the Frisian data. In general, then, RT forces us to posit massive homonymy between reflexive and referentially independent pronouns, even when they are in every respect identical.
A simpler explanation for the distribution of Frisian se is based on the fact that it is unaccented, unlike har and him (Sipma 1913 : 66, Tiersma 1985 . If we suppose that because se is unaccented it must lean enclitically on a lexical word to its left, which for syntactic reasons can only be the verb or adjective that governs it, then it follows that it cannot stand as a bare dative, or be governed by a preposition. In short, instead of hypothesizing an otherwise unmotivated inherent Case for Frisian, and positing morphosyntactically defective twins for most of its pronouns (such as har, him, etc.), we can derive the distribution of se from the fact that it is phonologically weak. The special behavior of se among Frisian pronouns turns out to be an instance of the generalization that the clitic forms of pronouns are obviative, hence not used reflexively, which we have already seen in Greek. 4 In a response to criticism by Evans & Levinson (2009 ), Reuland & Everaert (2010 have further clarified the RT treatment of languages without reflexive pronouns by proposing an analysis of Fijian, where "in the third person, a verb with the transitive marker -a and without an explicit object is interpreted as having unmarked reference to a third-singular object which is noncoreferential with the subject. If coreference or reflexivity is intended, a full object pronoun (e.g. 'ea, thirdsingular object) is required, and although this might be interpreted disjointedly, it encourages a coreferential reading" (Dixon 1988, 256) . R&E's idea is that Fijian licenses the reflexive interpretation of the overt pronoun in (41a) by a "doubling" procedure, involving the adjunction of the full pronoun 'ea to a covert null pronoun; the structure of (41a) would then really be as shown in (42) The RT analysis again comes at a price: once covert doubling of pronouns is allowed, then additional constraints must rule out the ungrammatical combinations in (43), and the typology predicted by the theory expands in unwanted ways. From the BOT perspective, Fijian has two vanilla pronouns: (1) an obviative null pronoun (like Spanish ∅, and comparable to obviative unaccented or weak pronouns such as Frisian se, Greek ἑ-), and (2) non-obviative 'ea, which may be interpreted as coreferential or disjoint (like other accentable pronouns such as Frisian hem, Old English him, and Greek accented ἕ-). The generalization that weak pronouns are obviative runs through all these systems. The preference for coreferential interpretation of 'ea is expected, though it remains unexplained why the blocking effect is not stronger.
Logophoric use of anaphors
The final possibility for accommodating μιν in RT that remains to be examined is that it is a logophor. Almost all anaphors that appear to be bound from outside a finite clause in Greek turn out to be discourse anaphors rather than reflexives: unaccented ἑ-in Homer, and αὐτό-in the classical language. But in both dialects we do sometimes find reflexives in positions where they have no syntactic antecedent, not even a long-distance one. The theoretical literature on anaphora refers to this special use of reflexives as LOGOPHORIC, co-opting a term originally referring to a distinct class of pronouns attested in some languages that conforms to (44) (from Clements 1975: 171, see also Hagège 1974 , Sells 1987 , Zribi-Hertz 1989 , Sigurdsson 1990 , Reuland 2006 , Thráinsson 2007 . Such instances of logophoric reflexives as I have found in Homeric Greek have the same properties as the logophoric reflexives reported for modern Icelandic and Faroese by Thrainsson (2007, Ch. 9): non-obligatoriness, non-occurrence in speaker-oriented clauses (e.g. adverbial or adjunct clauses), human antecedents, non-factive predicates of saying and thinking only, and restriction to bare unstrengthened reflexives (that is, Icelandic sig and Homeric ἕ-). Whoever wrote down and edited the Homeric MSS (presumably the Alexandrian scholars) understood Homeric grammar well enough to see that they are not simply discourse anaphors but reflexives of a special kind, and took care to put the accent on them that reflexives require. (45) (45a) could be rendered in English with himself. In context, its use is entirely appropriate. The reflexive keeps the relative clause within the scope of the imperative, ensuring its intensional interpretation: Achilles is implying that Agamemnon will find no-one more worthy than him.
Icelandic allows long-distance reflexives whose antecedents are apparently in different sentences (Thrainsson 2007: 472) . It occurs in the special type of reported speech known as "free indirect discourse", which occurs in Classical Greek as well. It is naturally analyzed as subordinated to ellipsed main clauses with a verb of saying or thinking, whose subject is the antecedent of a long-distance reflexive. Here is a characteristic Greek example. Each ECM clause comes under the scope of an implicit λέγουσι 'they say'. Greek seems to do this only with sequences of infinitive clauses, whereas the Icelandic construction involves finite subjunctive clauses. This does not necessarily indicate that Greek and Icelandic anaphors differ with respect to their binding domain; it looks like it has to do with their respective syntax of indirect discourse, perhaps involving different conditions under which ellipsis of the governing predicate is permitted.
Comparison of these logophoric uses of reflexives with the previously descriped uses of μιν as a discourse anaphor reveals fundamental differences. With μιν there is no explicit or implicit governing predicate of saying or thinking, and the perspective is the narrator's, not that of someone whose speech or thought is represented. I conclude that μιν is not a reflexive with a logophoric use.
R&R (2006) define the category of FOCUS LOGOPHOR as a discourse anaphor that marks focus or emphasis. It shares with other logophors the negative property that it does not stand in a syntactic relationship to an antecedent, but unlike them it is complex (obviative), e.g. himself, German sich selbst, and is available only in configurations where chain formation is structurally licensed. (47) The subject of the participial phrases ἀποδοθησόμενον in (47a) and λέγων in (47b) is Solon. An unintended local binding relation is available in each case: in (47a), that Croesus expects Solon to nominate himself (Solon) as the most fortunate creature, rather than Croesus himself (the intended meaning), and in (47b), that Croesus said that Solon was not speaking of himself (Solon), rather than that Solon was not speaking of Croesus himself (the intended meaning). These sentences illustrate R&R's insightful observation that a "focus logophoric" interpretation can successfully compete with syntactic binding, as is indeed confirmed by the English translations, where himself is quite idiomatic. As far as I know, μιν is never used a a focus logophor either.
As an aside, it is worth noting that Herodotus has several instances of reflexives in finite complement clauses headed by ὅκως, expressing the intended goal of the event denoted by the main clause (Powell 1933: 217) , such as (48): (48) These seem borderline cases between long-distance anaphora and focus logophora; if they are the former, they would be the only finite clauses in all of the work of these authors out of which reflexives can be bound. Either way, it is not clear why they are so common in just this type of clause.
In any case, comparison of the logophoric use of reflexives with the discourse anaphoric uses of μιν immediately shows that they have nothing in common. Non-reflexive μιν cannot be explained away as a logophor.
This completes our argument. The bottom line is that Greek joins Old English, Frisian, Fijian, Turkish, and Malay in attesting a class of true anaphors distinct both from reflexives and from pronominals, whose characteristic is that they may but need not have a structural antecedent. This class of anaphors requires an extension of binding theory, if not along the lines of BOT, then to something that equals and hopefully exceeds BOT's empirical coverage.
